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Abstract

In 2001, Ghodosi and Saeednia [3] proposed a modified
scheme that was resistant against this attack.
Very recently, Lee and Liao [4] showed that a conspiracy attack by three users can successfully decrypt an encrypted message with a probability 0.608.
In this paper, we strengthen the result of Lee and Liao
[4] by showing that the modified scheme is vulnerable to
any conspiracy attack by three or more users.
The paper is organized as follows. In the next section,
we briefly recall the scheme proposed in [3]. In Section 3,
we describe a conspiracy attack against the scheme and
Section 4 concludes the paper.

In a (t, n) group-oriented cryptosystem collaboration of
at least t participants is required to perform a designated
cryptographic operation. This type of cryptographic operation is very important to support an ad-hoc type network, such as the one that is built using Bluetooth or
ad-hoc wireless LAN, since the existence of a combiner
is not required to decrypt an encrypted message. In the
earlier paper, it was shown that a group-oriented encryption scheme, as proposed by Saeednia and Ghodosi, can
be subjected to a conspiracy attack in which two participants collude to decrypt an encrypted message. Recently,
it was shown that the modified scheme is subjected to a
A
Self-Certified
Groupconspiracy attack of at least three group members with 2
probability 0.608. In this paper, we show a stronger result
Oriented Cryptosystem Withthat shows any conspiracy of at least three group memout a Combiner
bers can collude and decrypt an encrypted message.
Keywords: Conspiracy attack, cryptography, group- For completeness, in this section, we briefly review the
Oriented Cryptosystem
scheme proposed in [3]. The scheme is as follows.

1

Introduction

Model:
There is a group U1 , U2 , · · · , Un of n participants and a
trusted authority (TA).

In a threshold cryptosystem the cryptographic power of
the transmitter, or the receiver, is distributed among a Setup Phase:
group of n participants such that any t out of n partic- TA chooses the following parameters:
ipants can perform the designated cryptographic opera• An integer N which is the product of two distinct
tion.
safe primes p and q (p = 2p0 + 1 and q = 2q 0 + 1,
Saeednia and Ghodosi [5] proposed a threshold encrypwhere p0 and q 0 are also prime integers).
tion system that allows a group of t participants to col• A prime F > N .
laboratively decrypt an encrypted message. An attractive
feature of the system was that public keys of users were
• A base α 6= 1 of order r = p0 q 0 mod N .
publicly verifiable.
We showed [6] that the scheme was vulnerable to a
• A one way hash function h that outputs integers less
conspiracy attack by two colluders.
than p0 and q 0 .

289

International Journal of Network Security, Vol.4, No.3, PP.288–291, May 2007

The authority makes (α, h, F, N ) public, keeps r secret loss of generality, let X1 < X2 < X3 , and X2 = X1 + R2
and X3 = X1 + R3 .
and discards p and q.
The three colluding members U1 , U2 and U3 receive the
Key Generation:
encrypted messages,
A group member Ui chooses his secret key xi , computes
its shadow zi = αxi mod N , and sends zi to TA. He then
e1 = mα−X1 h(m) (mod N ),
uses a zero-knowledge protocol to convince the TA that
e2 = mα−(X1 +R2 )h(m) (mod N ),
he knows the secret key. TA chooses a random value ri
e3 = mα−(X1 +R3 )h(m) (mod N ),
and sends it to Ui and also generates Ui ’s public key as,
yi = (zi−1 − IDi )IDi

−1

mod N,

where IDi = h(Ii ) and IDi is the Ui ’s identity (Ii can be
some information such as his name, address, etc).
Encryption:
If Alice wants to encrypt a message m (0 ≤ m ≤ N )
for the group, such that any t out of n receivers can retrieve and decrypt her message, then she will perform the
following steps.
1) Randomly choose an integer k and compute c =
α−k mod N .
2) Form a polynomial of degree t − 1 in GF (F ) such
that f (0) = αh(m) mod N . That is,

and compute,
η1

=

η2

=

e2
= α−R2 h(m)
e1
e3
= α−R3 h(m)
e1

(mod N ),
(mod N ).

We consider three cases:
Case 1: gcd(R2 , R3 ) = 1:
Colluders use the extended Euclid algorithm to compute
a2 , a3 ∈ Z such that,
a2 R2 + a3 R3 = 1,
and find g −h(m) (mod N ) as,
ρ

= η1a2 η2a3

(mod N )

−(a2 R2 +a3 R3 )h(m)

= α
= α−h(m)

f (x) = a0 + a1 x + · · · + at−1 xt−1
h(m)

in GF (F ), where a0 = α

mod N .

3) Compute for i = 1, · · · , n,
wi

=

yiIDi + IDi mod N,

si
di

=
=

wik mod N,
f (si ),

ei

=

mwi

h(m)

mod N,

(mod N )

(mod N ).

Finally they decrypt the message as,
e1
ρX1

(mod N ) =

mα−X1 h(m)
α−X1 h(m)

(mod N ).

Case 2: gcd(R2 , R3 ) = δ, δ 6= 1 and δ is small:
The colluders first compute δ = gcd(R2 , R3 ) and set
R̃2 = Rδ2 and R̃3 = Rδ3 . Next, they use the extended
Euclid algorithm to compute a2 , a3 ∈ Z such that,

and send (t, c, di , ei ) to Ui .
Decryption:
and compute,
To decrypt a cryptogram, t group members must collaborate. If U1 , · · · Ut want to decrypt ciphertext c, first
ρ =
Ui , i = 1, · · · t, calculates
=
xi
si = c mod N,
=

a2 R̃2 + a3 R̃3 = 1,

η1a2 η2a3

(mod N ),

−(a2 R2 +a3 R3 )h(m)

α

−δ(a2 R˜2 +a3 R˜3 )h(m)

α
α−δh(m)

(mod N ),
(mod N ),

=
(mod N ).
and broadcasts the pair (di , si ). After t such pairs are
h(m)
broadcasted, each Ui can recover v = α
mod N and Finally U computes,
1
compute the plaintext message as
eδ1
ζ =
(mod N ),
m = v xi ei mod N.
ρX1
mδ α−X1 δh(m)
=
(mod N ),
α−X1 δh(m)
3 Conspiracy Attack
= mδ (mod N ),
We show a conspiracy attack in which a group of at least
three participants can decrypt an encrypted message.
and the problem is to find m, given ζ = mδ (mod N )
Let U1 , U2 and U3 be the colluding members and denote and δ. This is the well-known RSA problem which, if
their secret keys by X1 , X2 and X3 , respectively. Without δ < N 0.292 , is known to have an efficient algorithm [1,
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2, 7]). We note that TA does not know the secret keys
More precisely, we should consider probability of Case
of participants and there is no way for the TA to enforce 2. Let P r2 be the probability that the greatest comthis condition.
mon divisor of two uniformly chosen integers is less than
N 0.292 , i.e,
Case 3: gcd(R2 , R3 ) = δ, δ 6= 1 and δ is large:
If δ is large, we will extend the attack, as shown be- P r2 = P r[δ = gcd(R1, R2), 1 < R1, R2 < N |δ < N 0.292 ].
low, such that as the number of colluders increases their
success chance will also increase.
Instead of identifying P r2 , we estimate the expected value
Let A(e1 , e2 , e3 ) denote a procedure that takes three of δ. If two integers R1 and R2 are even, the probability
ciphertexts e1 , e2 and e3 from three colluders P1 , P2 is 1/4 and the gcd is 2. Hence, the expected value of gcd
and P3 respectively, use the methods described in Cases is


1 and 2, and either outputs the message m, or Fail.
1
The extended attack repeatedly uses A(e1 , e2 , e3 ) for
E[δ] = Sumi=2,3,5,7,..,δ 2 ∗ i
i
subsets of three colluders until m is found. The attack is


1
summarised in the following algorithm.
< Sumi=2,3,4,..,δ 2 ∗ i
i
Algorithm 3.1:
= Hδ − 1
Conspiracy Attack (U0 , U1 , · · · , Ub , b ≥ 3)
where Hδ is a harmonic number. If we consider the
threshold value of δ is up to 11, the expected δ is
V0 ← {U0 , U1 , U2 }, i ← 1, j ← 1, k ← 2, l ← 3.
55991/27720 = 2.02, which implies that the gcd does not
increases. Therefore, we conclude that combining Cases
Apply A(ej ; ek ; el ) :
1 and 2 gives significant probability of attack.
while m is not found

Vi ← Vi−1 ∪ {Ui+2 }




for all W ⊂ Vi , W ← {Uj , Uk , Ul }, j 6= k 6= l :



if A(ej , ek , el ) 6= m
do
then choose another W




else stop



i←i+1

4

Conclusion

We have shown that the modified scheme proposed in [3]
can be subjected to conspiracy attack by at least three
group members and hence is insecure.
This result strengthen the attack in [4] that showed a
conspiracy of at least three participants can successfully
decrypt an encrypted message with a probability 0.608. In
The attack starts with three colluders and if m cannot contrast to [4], we show that if at least three participants
be found add colluders one by one until the message is conspire, then they will certainly be able to decrypt an
encrypted message.
found.
Let us estimate how certain the conspiracy attack
would succeed. According to the Direichlet’s result, the
probability that given two integers chosen at random are
relatively prime is
P r0 = 6/π 2 = 0.608.
So, Case 1 happens with very high probability. Since
the secret key xi is picked independently by each group
member, it is hard to avoid two keys from being relatively
prime. Even if the first match fails, the probability of
success increases as many members
 colluded. Given b
colluders, by noticing there are 2b pairs, the probability
of Case 1 is
2
1 − (1 − P r0 )(b −b)/2 .
As shown in the well-known birthday problem, the attack
succeeds if we have the number of colluders given by
p
b = (π w /6) = 1.283,
with probability 50%.
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